Trip Report
Winter Scramble - Red Mountain (Commonwealth Basin)
This report is written by the Seattle Scrambling Leadership team as part of an incident review. A scrambler fell/slid several hundred feet and required a helicopter evacuation during this trip which is the focus of this report. As reported a few weeks after the incident, the fallen scrambler experienced no major injuries and is well on their way to a full recovery.
- Sat, Jan 24, 2026
- Winter Scramble - Red Mountain (Commonwealth Basin)
- Red Pass & Mountain (Commonwealth Basin)
- Scrambling
- Turned Around
- Road suitable for all vehicles
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Moderately firm snow on the approach and start of the ascent becoming quite firm as elevation was gained. Some exposed rock and rock sections at the higher elevations.
The group size was ten including a primary leader, two designated co-leaders, five 2025 scrambling grads, one 2025 basic climbing grad, and one 2024 basic climbing grad.
Crampons and ice axes were not required equipment for this outing but it was recognized they might be required for the ascent and this was discussed during the pre-trip briefing at the parking location. Seven in the group had crampons, three did not. Only one individual (the primary leader) did NOT have an ice axe. The possibility of splitting into separate groups was discussed, with participants not having the necessary gear or not feeling safe staying behind rather than ascending to the summit. The group proceeded with the outing with the Red Mountain summit as the objective.
The approach through Commonwealth Basin was completed successfully with no noted significant observations or concerns. The temperature was believed to be right around freezing level (32 degrees F).
During the ascent out of the Basin the group started to become separated. One scrambler (A) proceeded ahead of and across a ravine from a middle “core” group. A co-leader in this group yelled to the scrambler ahead to rejoin the group and again to stop and wait but this scrambler reported not hearing any verbal communications. The leader and at least one other scrambler were proceeding below the middle group. A scrambler (B) who had been slowed by multiple crampon on/off transitions followed the path of scrambler (A) and proceeded relatively quickly off to the side and then above the middle group. Scrambler (A) had stopped and was waiting when scrambler (B) approached to a point near them and stopped close enough to have a discussion. Scrambler (B) had crampons and helmet on and were using their ice axe at this time. Scrambler (A) and (B) were out of sight of the middle and lower groups.
As communicated by the fallen scrambler (B) - “I got complacent up there, chose a poor resting spot, and my side hill grip blew. Ice axe ripped out of my hands on the first self arrest attempt.” They proceeded to fall and slide, sometimes becoming airborne, for several hundred feet down the slope including between two scramblers in the middle group and then past the trailing group who were yelling “Arrest, Arrest”. At one point they hit a tree but bounced off and continued to fall/slide. They were eventually able to stop by using their feet and crampons to brake. The fall occurred at about 11:00am.
The lower group yelled down to the fallen scrambler but did not hear a response. A co-leader called 911, and the first aid lead immediately and cautiously started heading down to the fallen scrambler. The primary leader who was at the end of the group and closest to the fallen scrambler also headed down towards them. The rest of the participants also started to descend and it was noted that there was some rockfall initiated by Scrambler (B) endangering the rest of the group but not resulting in any impact or injury.
The First Aid lead provided care to the fallen scrambler and called 911 communicating the assessment and condition of the fallen scrambler. A helicopter evacuation was initiated and an extraction occurred at approximately 2:00pm.
The fallen scrambler's backpack which had fallen further down the slope during helicopter evacuation was found and retrieved by the trip leader and the group descended and hiked out to the cars. At the cars, the remaining nine scramblers formed a team circle and shared a group hug, followed by each person (sharing their thoughts and) reflecting on the day’s events. This was felt to be emotionally supportive and helpful for everyone (in the group).
Incident Review Lessons learned
The following lessons learned were compiled from participants on the trip and scramble committee leadership. Not all are direct contributors to the fall, but conclusions or guidance to prevent future similar accidents.
Behavioral and Leadership
- Situational Awareness and focus. From fallen scrambler - “I got complacent up there, chose a poor resting spot, and my side hill grip blew. Ice axe ripped out of my hands on the first self arrest attempt.” Highlights the need to use solid practices and technique and stay mentally engaged even at times that feel routine.
- Group Management
- Staying together as a group especially on technical terrain. When kicking steps in snow, it is best practice for the group to follow in the same steps, while improving them for the person/people behind. Getting together as a group at the start of the technical terrain/ascent to discuss route and equipment considerations (e.g. helmet, crampons, rockfall risk, etc).
- Decisions to split a group need to be made very critically and thoughtfully with considerations including leadership responsibilities, communications, incident response protocols, and with acceptance by all group members.
- Adapting to the capabilities of the group. Leaders need to consider and/or adjust to the experience level and observed skill level of participants. Create the environment and set expectations for participants to speak up if they are not confident in their skills or are concerned about the terrain. Consider opportunities to review and/or practice or demonstrate skills before getting in challenging/risky terrain.
- Equipment requirements - In terms of gear, err on the side of “having but not needing versus not having and needing (or desiring to have)”. Put on / get out technical gear before getting into the terrain where it is required. (note the fallen scrambler had crampons on, ice axe in use, and very fortunately was wearing their helmet). Strongly consider canceling, turning around, or adjusting trip plans if anyone does not have (potentially) required gear.
Technical and Training
- Snow Travel Skills and Technique - More instruction and emphasis on walking in balance including stepping and footwork techniques and attention to safety when stopped/resting.
- Ice Axe Grip - cane versus self-arrest (refer to Freedom of the Hills 10th edition, page 355, figure 16-10). This continues to be a very substantial concern of Seattle Scrambling Leadership. The confidence level in the ability of a scrambler or climber to successfully transition from cane grip to self arrest grip while experiencing a fall event is low, at least without substantial experience and practice and even then introduces a potential point of failure. Seattle Scrambling Leadership strongly advocates for the use of the self arrest grip especially when traveling in terrain that may require a self arrest.
- Self arrest need and reaction time. Don’t assume that conditions are favorable enough to stop a fall without self arresting (e.g. by just digging in hands or feet). Emphasize need to assertively initiate action to stop a fall/slide before speed increases, momentum is picked up, and/or dangers are reached (e.g. rocks, ledges, cliffs, steeper terrain)
- Crampon usage and experience - recognize that representative snow conditions are often not available during course activities or student snow scrambles to effectively practice and demonstrate crampon techniques. This reinforces the need for conservative decision-making around terrain and participant readiness. Another strong consideration for #3 above.
Giving Space After an Incident
This incident was in a popular recreation zone and was further well-publicized on the search and rescue page which left trip participants limited space to breathe after the incident.
In the aftermath of an incident, it’s natural to want answers. Experienced outdoorspeople, in particular, may feel a strong pull to understand what happened—both out of concern and a desire to learn. But timing and approach matter. After an incident, those directly involved are often processing shock, replaying decisions, and coping with stress or trauma. Immediate requests for detailed explanations can feel overwhelming or even accusatory, particularly if they come before individuals have had time to reflect, rest, and regain perspective.
A key lesson is to give people space in the immediate aftermath. If you’re not directly involved in the response, consider pausing before reaching out. Ask yourself whether your questions are urgent, or whether they can wait. When you do follow up, framing matters—lead with care, not critique.
Creating a culture of learning in the outdoor community depends not only on sharing information, but on doing so in a way that respects the people involved. Allowing time and space after an incident makes it more likely that, when individuals are ready, they can share their experiences in a way that is constructive, reflective, and ultimately more valuable to others.
We are grateful for those involved with this incident for sharing their perspectives!
Seattle Scramble